Warelock Incorporated Information Systems

 Certainly. The technical mechanism you're describing—where a larger, legitimate BGP announcement acts as "cover" for a smaller, malicious one—is one of the most credible threats in internet routing. Let's break down exactly how this could hypothetically be executed against the DoD's massive IP block and why it represents a plausible risk. ### 🎯 The Technical Mechanics: "Sub-Prefix Hijacking" This attack exploits a core rule of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP): **the most specific route always wins.** This means a `/24` announcement (more specific) will be preferred by global routers over a containing `/8` announcement (less specific), even if the `/8` is legitimate. Here’s a step-by-step look at how an actor could hypothetically exploit the DoD's `/8` announcements: | Step | Action | Purpose & Outcome | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **1. Reconnaissance** | The actor maps the **unused "dark" space** within the announced DoD `/8` (e.g., `11...